

# The Second Meeting of the Behavioral and Experimental Economics Network (BEEN)

18<sup>th</sup> of September 2018

**Location:** Aula 411 at the *Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS “Guido Carli”*,  
Viale Romania 32, Roma, Italy

## Program

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10.45-11.00 **Welcome and Coffee (Faculty Lounge, 5th floor)**

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**Session 1 (Aula 411)- Chair: Daniela Di Cagno**

11.00-11.15 *“Telling the Other What One Knows? Strategic Lying in a Modified Acquiring-a-Company Experiment with Two-sided Private Information”*

**TBA**, LUISS Guido Carli

11.15-11.40 *“Don’t you just love being in control?” An experiment of the impact of message content on consumption awareness*

**Arianna Galliera**, Dipartimento di Ingegneria Gestionale (DIG), Politecnico di Milano

11.40-12.05 *The Normative Perception of Power Abuse*

**Alexander Vostroknutov**, CIMEC, University of Trento

12.05-12.30 *The effect of reporting multiple private information outcomes on the inclination to cheat*

**Antonio Filippin**, University of Milano

12.30-12.55 *Civicness Drain*

**Marco Casari**, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna

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12.55-14.15 **Lunch**

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**Session 2 (Aula 411) - Chair: Francesca Marazzi**

14.15-14.30 *The Power of Identity in Multicultural Societies*

**Natalia Montinari**, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna

14.30 14.45 *Individual incentive vs public support. An experiment on contribution to collective goals*

**Caterina Giannetti**, Università di Pisa

14.45 15.00 *Whistleblowing with collective remuneration and teamwork: an experimental study*

**Valeria Maggian**, Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia

15.00-15.15 *Intentions and consequences in dishonest behavior*

**Matteo Ploner**, Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento

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15.15-15.45 **Coffee Break**

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**Session 3 (Aula 411) - Chair: Andrej Angelovski**

15.45-16.10 *Gender stereotypes and educational choices: combining experimental and survey data*

**Dominique Cappelletti**, University of Verona

16.10-16.25 *Frustration and Anger in the Ultimatum Game: An Experiment.*

**Marianna Baggio**, Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento

16.25-16.40 *Does Men’s Colleague Preference Deter Women’s Career Progression?*

**Yuki Takahashi**, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna

16.40-16.55 *TBA*

**Luca Panaccione**, University of Rome Tor Vergata

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## **Abstract (Long Presentations)**

**Title:** *“Don’t you just love being in control?” An experiment of the impact of message content on consumption awareness*

**Presenter:** **Arianna Galliera**

**Abstract:** Individuals attend very little to their own spending, in spite of the effect of attention on expenditure reductions. There are thus large welfare gains from increased attention to consumption choices. Using two field experiments with customers of a large gas utility, we investigate how to attract attention to individual consumption choices. We evaluate the impact of two communication campaigns encouraging customers to submit self-reads, so as to be billed on the basis of their real and not of their estimated consumption. In the first experiment, the campaign messages expose randomly selected customers to different behavioural nudges. In the second experiment, treatment messages stress that customers who submit a read can check their consumption in the subsequent bill. In both studies, messages that make more explicit the link between submitting a self-read and keeping one’s own bill expenditures under control are the most effective in encouraging self-reads.

**Title:** *The Normative Perception of Power Abuse*

**Presenter:** **Alexander Vostroknutov**

**Abstract:** We study the behavior of subjects who are given power over others, the reasons behind subjects’ choices to abuse this power, and the effects that power abuse has on the powerless. In the first stage of an experiment, subjects play a standard repeated public goods game, but one of them (punisher) is given an ability to costlessly punish others (victims), while all they can do is choose their contributions to the public good. In the second stage, we elicit subjects’ beliefs about the prevailing social norms among punishers and victims (Krupka, Weber, JEEA, 2013). We find that the beliefs of both punishers and victims can be explained by the Belief in a Just World Hypothesis (BJW, Lerner, 1980). Punishers, who abuse their power by forcing victims to contribute more than themselves, believe that it is socially appropriate to do so, while punishers who do not abuse their power find it not appropriate. Victims, who were subject to an unfair treatment, also find abuse more appropriate than those who did not experience it. Thus, in accordance with BJW, punishers rationalize their behavior by having consistent beliefs, and victims similarly rationalize the circumstances that they cannot change. In addition, we find that simply becoming a punisher renders subjects incapable of understanding that others might not share their beliefs, while victims are perfectly able to do that. These findings demonstrate the fearsome capacity of humans to exculpate the abuse and the resulting abusive circumstances.

**Title:** *The effect of reporting multiple private information outcomes on the inclination to cheat*

**Presenter:** **Antonio Filippin**

**Abstract:** This paper investigates experimentally how the inclination to cheat is affected by cumulative rather than one-shot reporting of private information outcomes that are also determined by a stochastic component. Thanks to the law of large numbers, reporting repeated actions is more informative because justifying extreme outcomes with unlikely random events would expose the agent as a liar. We find indeed that the associated reputation concerns dramatically reduce high claims. At the same time, knowing the distribution of the stochastic component leads to a small but widespread inclination to adjust upwards low and medium outcomes, with moral self-balancing being the explanation that better fits our results. The two opposite effects are similar in magnitude and display an interesting gender connotation, with the intrinsic cost of cheating playing a more relevant role for females.

**Title:** *Civicness Drain*

**Presenter:** **Marco Casari**

**Abstract:** Migration may cause not only a brain drain but also a civicness drain, leading to an uncivicness trap. We study this possibility using college choices of southern-Italian students classified as Civic if not cheating in a die-roll experiment. Local civicness is the fraction of Civic in their high-school class. A civicness drain is observed at high and low civicness. We explain this finding in a model in which Civic and Uncivic types balance hope vs. fear of migration outcomes, taking into account economic gains, risk preferences, and their beliefs about being considered Civic in the place of destination.

**Title:** *Gender stereotypes and educational choices: combining experimental and survey data*

**Presenter:** **Dominique Cappelletti**

**Abstract:** Although the labour market increasingly requires skills in science, technology, and math (STM), in several European countries, including Italy, this increasing demand is not matched by an analogous increase in the number of youngsters pursuing studies in these fields.

The problem is particularly pronounced for female students, who are much less likely than males to enrol in STM tracks. One explanation proposed for the underrepresentation of females in STM fields is the presence of gender-based stereotypes. We run an experiment and administered a survey among 8<sup>th</sup> graders in Italy, who are called to make an important educational choice that will greatly affect their upper educational opportunities and labour market prospects. The experiment, combined with the survey, aims to investigate the presence of gender-based stereotypes among 8<sup>th</sup> graders and, ultimately, whether these stereotypes are related to the educational choices of female students.

## List of Participants

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