Organized Information Transmission

Mer, 10/11/2021 - 12:00 / 13:00

405, Viale Romania

Speaker: Laurent Mathevet , European University Institute

Authors: Laurent Mathevet, Ina Taneva


In practice, how information can be transmitted to its recipients is just as important as its content. In this paper, we introduce families of (indirect) information structures, namely meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies, that capture the horizontal and vertical dimensions of real-world transmission. We characterize the strategic outcomes that they implement in general (finite) incomplete information games and illustrate the resulting linear programming approach in the linear network model. Then, we build on the characterizations to show that these families of information structures are optimal in binary-action games with strategic complementarities. Our application to classical regime-change games illustrates the variety of optimal meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies as a function of the objective to maximize.

Further details regarding the paper at the following link