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Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection

30 settembre 2020 ore 12:00 - 13:00

Aula aula virtuale 71, Sede di Luiss

Speaker: Andrea Attar, Università degli Studi di Roma "Tor Vergata"

Abstract:

"This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We first provide a general necessary and sufficient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprofitable. We then use this result to characterize, in an active market, a unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by a market tariff making additional trades with an entrant unprofitable. Motivated by the recursive structure of this allocation, we finally show that it emerges as the essentially unique equilibrium outcome of a discriminatory ascending auction. These results yield sharp predictions for competitive nonexclusive markets."

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