Al fine di migliorare la tua esperienza di navigazione, questo sito utilizza i cookie di profilazione di terze parti. Chiudendo questo banner o accedendo ad un qualunque elemento sottostante acconsenti all’uso dei cookie.

Noncooperative Foundation of Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solutions from Strategic Uncertainty

12 novembre 2020 ore 17:00 - 18:00

Aula Luiss Research Seminars, Sede di Luiss

Speaker: Philippe Bich, Paris School of Economics

Abstract

We provide a new non cooperative foundation of several bargaining solutions (Nash bargaining solution, Smorodinsky solution), which also permit to unify these notions. We use prudent games, introduced in (Bich JET 2019), which incorporates strategic uncertainty and some prudent behavior related to it. Roughly, we explain how a certain type of « prudence » (we will define) induces a certain type of solution in bargaining games.