Speaker: Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University
The Proportional Allocation of Non-Separable Contribution Value (PANSC-value) is a new cooperative game solution concept, which allocates the payoffs proportional to the non-separable contributions of the agents. However, it is very related to an old cost allocation problem, like TVA water resource development project.
Under zero profit conditions, it coincides with the well-known SCRB method.
The value is also related to the minimal transfer rule, which is the most popular solutions in queueing problems. Since queueing games are so-called 2-games, meaning that only coalitions of size one or two can have a nonzero Harsanyi dividend, this minimal transfer rule coincides with, for example, the Shapley value, nucleolus, τ -value, or EANSC value of the associated queueing game. We will give a motivation and axiomatic characterizations of this new solution, including a consistency.