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Optimal make-take fees for market making regulation

27 marzo 2019 ore 14:30 - 16:00

Aula 407B, Sede di Viale Romania 32

Speaker: Nizar Touzi, Ecole Polytechnique

Abstract: We address the mechanism design problem of an exchange setting suitable make-take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach, we provide the optimal compensation scheme of a market maker in quasi-explicit form. This contract depends essentially on the market maker inventory trajectory and on the volatility of the asset. We also provide the optimal quotes thatshould be displayed by the market maker. The simplicity of our formulas allows us to analyze in details the effects of optimal contracting with an exchange, compared to a situation without contract.
We show in particular that it improves liquidity and reduces trading costs for investors. We extend our study to an oligopoly of symmetric exchanges and we studied the impact of such common agency policy on the system.