Speaker: Giovanni Ponti, Universidad de Alicante, LUISS
We report experimental evidence from a 3-person Dictator Game in which dictators decide over the distribution of probabilities of winning a ﬁxed, indivisible, monetary prize. This evidence is compared with (i) a standard (control) treatment in which money is perfectly divisible and Dictators allocate shares of the prize across the group members, and also with (ii) a “hybrid” protocol by which a fraction of the prize is allocated deterministically, and the remainder by way of a lottery. Dictators’ decisions are framed within a (suitably modiﬁed version of) Karni and Safra (2002a)’s model of distributional justice. This allows us to identify consequentialist vs. procedural fairness, also controlling for (own-payo↵) risk aversion. Our evidence suggests that, among those not exhibiting a completely selﬁsh behavior, both views of fairness are complementary in explaining dictators’ distributional decisions.