This website uses third party cookies to improve your experience. If you continue browsing or close this notice, you will accept their use.

Spatial competition with non uniformly distributed consumers

8 May 2018 at 12:00 PM - 1:00 PM

Room 104, Campus on Viale Romania, 32

Speaker: Gaëtan Fournier, Université d'Aix-Marseille

Abstract:

A pure Hotelling game is a competition between a finite number of players who select simultaneously a location in order to attract as many consumers as possible. In this paper, we study the case of a general distribution of consumers on a network generated by a metric graph. Because players do not compete on price, the continuum of consumers shop at the closest player’s location. Under regularity hypothesis on the distribution we prove the existence of an ε-equilibrium in pure strategies and we construct it, provided that the number of players is larger than a lower bound.