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Equilibria in the challenge tournament

25 ottobre 2018 ore 12:00 - 13:00

Aula 207, Sede di Viale Romania, 32

Speaker: Bernhard von Stengel, London School of Economics

Abstract:

Arad and Rubinstein (2013) describe a challenge tournament where n players have a binary choice and play a round-robin tournament where they score against each other randomly for a stake that depends on their choices. The player with the highest total score wins, with ties resolved randomly. They conjecture that for n > 3 the only equilibrium is that all players take the riskier choice. We present work in progress on an elementary proof of this conjecture which is based on a simple dominance argument.