Al fine di migliorare la tua esperienza di navigazione, questo sito utilizza i cookie di profilazione di terze parti. Chiudendo questo banner o accedendo ad un qualunque elemento sottostante acconsenti all’uso dei cookie.

Picking sequences for the allocation of indivisible goods

24 maggio 2016 ore 12:00 - 13:00

Aula 207, Sede di Viale Romania, 32

Speaker: Jerome Lang, Lamsade, Université Paris-Dauphine

Abstract:

Picking  sequences  are  a  natural  way  of  allocating  indivisible  items  to  agents  in  a
decentralized manner: at each stage, a designated agent chooses an item among those
that  remain  available.

The main problem consists in choosing the “best” sequence of agents,  according to some optimality criterion.
We  assume  that  agents  have  additive  preferences over  objects.   The  choice  of  an  optimality  crite-
rion depends on three parameters:  how utilities of objects  are  related  to  their  ranking  in  an  agent’s
preference relation; how the preferences of different agents are correlated; and how social welfare is
defined from the agents’ utilities.  We address the computation  of  a  sequence  maximizing  expected
social welfare under several assumptions.  We also address strategic issues.

Based on the following two papers
Sylvain Bouveret, Jérôme Lang:
Manipulating picking sequences. ECAI 2014: 141-146
Sylvain Bouveret, Jérôme Lang:
A General Elicitation-Free Protocol for Allocating Indivisible Goods. IJCAI 2011: 73-78