Speaker: Anna Conte, Max Planck Institute of Economics
Abstract: As in ultimatum bargaining, the proposer makes an offer that the responder can reject. Non-acceptance results in 0 payoffs with some positive probability. With the complementary probability, the responder can freely take whatever s/he wants of the second-stage smaller pie, offering the residual to the proposer who can refuse to collect it. In other words, participants first interact as in ultimatum games and possibly later, with reversed roles and a smaller pie, as in (private) impunity games. The solution play as well as the choices of both players and their agreement in the first stage depend symmetrically on both the probability and the pie size of the second stage. Furthermore, both players are proposing as well as responding, albeit on different stages. This allows for unifying econometric models for both players which, when applied to our very large data set, reveal a remarkable similarity of behaviour in both roles.