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Unanimous Implementation: A Case for Approval Mechanisms

16 February 2016 at 12:00 PM - 1:00 PM

Room 207, Campus on Viale Romania, 32

Speaker: Mathias Nunez, Université Paris Dauphine

Abstract: We consider a class of indirect mechanisms, the Approval ones, in
which the players’ strategies coincide with the subsets of the outcome space. We
focus on the single-peaked domain and we prove that: a) each of these rules is
characterized by a unique equilibrium outcome and b) for every strategy-proof
single-peaked rule there exists an Approval one that unanimously implements
it. That is, Approval rules fix the problem of equilibrium-outcome multiplicity
that is inherent to the ensuing games of strategy-proof single-peaked rules and,
perhaps more importantly, promote social coherence: the implemented outcome
is approved by every player.